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tively, the need for a State Bill of Rights and the content which those
rights must embrace.
John M. Steelt
I. WHY A STATE BILL OF RIGHTS?*
VERN COUNTRYMAN**
There is a school of thought among policemen, prosecutors, legisla-
tors, lawyers, law professors and other scholars that the Supreme
Court of the United States has given us more of a Bill of Rights under
the federal Constitution than we need. This view is by no means
unanimous, but it is widespread.' Periodically this view manifests
itself in thus far unsuccessful efforts in Congress to restrict the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court. One such effort was defeated in the
Senate less than a month ago.' A few years ago the Council of State
Governments was sponsoring an amendment to the Constitution to
create a "Court of the Union," made up of the chief justices of the
fifty states, to review decisions of the Supreme Court involving "rights
reserved to the states or to the people."3
Some of the criticism of the Court does not rise above the level of
1 Articles Editor, Washington Law Review.
* This article was presented at the State Constitutional Revision Conference,
sponsored by the University of Washington School of Law, Seattle, Washington (June
13-14, 1968).
** Professor of Law, Harvard University. B.A., University of Washington, 1939,
LL.B., 1942.
1. For collections of, and rebuttals to, expressions of this view, see Choper, On the
Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 20 (1967); Kamisar, On
the Tactics of Police-Prosecution Oriented Critics of the Courts, 49 CoN-. L.Q. 436
(1964); BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).
2. The Senate acted to delete from S. 917, 90th Congress, 2d Session the so-called
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Bill, provisions which would deprive the fed-
eral courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction over state criminal convictions and of juris-
diction to review in any manner state court rulings on the admission of confessions and
of evidence of police line-up identifications. 114 CONG. REc. S6037-S6045 (daily ed.
May 21, 1968).
3. See Monroe, To Preserve the United States, 8 ST. Louis L.J. 533 (1964).
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this proposal. Senator Sam Ervin, Jr. has announced that he will
launch an investigation to determine whether the Supreme Court is
exceeding its powers, because he finds the Court "faced with a crisis of
confidence of a magnitude rarely equaled in its history" 4-- which seems
to me a rather heroic statement for a member of Congress to make.
Richard Nixon, campaigning in Dallas, has castigated the Court for
giving the "green light" to "the criminal elements" in our society-
but that is about par for Mr. Nixon.5
I do not intend here to pursue this debate, although candor requires
me to acknowledge that in general my sympathies are with the Court
rather than its detractors. Rather, I am concerned today with a some-
what different question: with the Supreme Court so active in im-
plementing the federal Bill of Rights as against state as well as federal
action, is there any real need for a Bill of Rights in a state constitu-
tion?
One affirmative answer to that question, given by a Texas lawyer,
is that a state Bill of Rights should be perpetuated as part of the
battle to "halt, or at least slow down, the expansion of federal power
and . . . [to] revitalize state governments" because, "If the states
cannot protect their citizens' fundamental liberties, or are careless
about such protection, . . . the basic, fundamental vitality of state
government is immeasurably weakened."' There is something to this
answer, although it does not seem to me completely dispositive. An-
other way of putting it would be to say that the Supreme Court got
into this business by default-there would have been few occasions
for it to decide what the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment requires of the states by incorporation of the guarantees of some
of the first eight amendments7 or otherwise, if the state courts had
not found that their own constitutions required so little. But this
result cannot be attributed to the absence of Bills of Rights in state
constitutions. Every state constitution contains one, and most of them
4. New York Times, May 17, 1968, at 32, col. 2.
5. New York Times, May 31, 1968, at 29, col. 1.
6. Hart, The Bill oj Rights: Safeguard of Individual Liberty, 35 TEx. L. REv. 919,
924 (1957).
7. Perhaps the ninth amendment is also on its way to incorporation. See Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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largely duplicate the provisions of the federal Bill of Rights.8 The
default came when the state courts, generally speaking, gave an un-
generous interpretation to their own Bills of Rights.
It is doubtful, at least, that very much can be done to change this
result by a redrafting of a state Bill of Rights. The change must come
in the judges who interpret it. But since-for reasons which I will
develop later-it seems to me realistic to expect some change in the
judges, I can see some merit to the view that state Bills of Rights
should be preserved with the expectation that we may yet see the day
when state constitutional adjudication will drastically limit the oc-
casions for the Supreme Court to test state action by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
But, beyond that point, I believe that there are other reasons why
any state constitutional convention of today should concern itself
with devising a Bill of Rights which both reflects time-tested concepts
and responds to modern needs. No state, even if it were otherwise
willing to abdicate the function of protecting individual liberty entirely
to the federal government, should today be willing to do so for at least
three reasons: (1) Many of the Supreme Court's interpretations of
federal constitutional guarantees applicable to the states are not
clearly acceptable today, much less for the indefinite future. (2) Not
all of the federal constitutional guarantees have been held applicable
to the states. (3) Modern society is entitled to expect additional
guarantees not to be found in the Constitution of the United States.
I. FEDERAL GUARANTEES APPLICABLE TO THE STATES
For those who believe that the Supreme Court has gone too far in
making federal guarantees applicable to the states, or in giving con-
tent to the guarantees applied, there is little that a state constitutional
convention can be expected to do. Of course, even as I look hopefully
to the day when state courts will give a more generous reading to state
guarantees, some may anticipate the day when the Supreme Court
becomes less generous, thereby leaving the states more freedom to be
8. Rankin, The Bill of Rights, in W. Gmves, MAJOR PROBLEMS iN STATE CONsu-
TuTONAL REVISION 162 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Rankin].
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less generous. To that end, they might advocate a more restricted list
of state guarantees to confine state courts when finally the Supreme
Court comes to its senses. But they would be courting the risk that
many of these state constitutional restrictions would be held uncon-
stitutional. Perhaps this risk could be avoided by enacting the restric-
tions into a legal limbo by means of a preamble which recited that
they should not take effect unless and until the federal Constitution
permits. Somehow this doesn't seem to me to represent a very promis-
ing course for constitution-making, but that may be because my heart
is really not in such a venture.
For those generally in agreement with the Supreme Court-and
perhaps even in some instances for some of those who are not-there
is still an office for a state Bill of Rights to perform. Even as others
may look forward to a day of more restrictive interpretation of federal
guarantees, we may fear such a day and therefore should value state
guarantees as a second line of defense. Moreover, at this as probably
at any other given moment in time, reasonable men may conclude that
at least some of the federal guarantees applicable to the states are not
broadly enough construed, or at least that a state should keep the way
open for broader protection in the future. Without attempting an
exhaustive list, I offer some examples.
First amendment rights have been incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment for more than forty years9 and those rights have recently
been broadly interpreted to protect freedom of association,0 religious
liberty,11 freedom to criticize public figures and public officials,' 2 free-
9. In the first cases involving state sedition prosecutions, it was assumed, without
deciding, that the fourteenth amendment incorporated first amendment rights, but no
violation of those rights was found. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) ; Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1926). But similar prosecutions in Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U.S. 380 (1927) and Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) were invalidated as
impermissible abridgements of free speech, which Gitlow and Whitney were read to
incorporate into the fourteenth amendment.
10. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
11. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U.S. 268 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
12. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Beckley Newspapers Corp. v.
Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 US. 64 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
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dom of access to information13 and, recently, freedom from a variety
of loyalty oaths. 14 But the loyalty oath decisions are recent and they
leave standing in somewhat dubious status earlier decisions sustaining
such oaths.15 A state might well conclude that in this and other
respects it wished to give its citizens more freedom of belief, expres-
sion and association than the first amendment has yet been found to
require.
The state might, for instance, extend the constitutional protection
given to peaceful picketing, which has lately come into as common
employment as a means of political expression as a labor organizing
device.' 6 It might, again, after observing the struggles of the Justices
in their efforts to define the kind of "obscenity" which gets no first
amendment protection, conclude that Justices Black and Douglas have
been right all along in their insistence that no such exception should
have been carved into the area of constitutionally protected speech.'
Perhaps, in the course of its consideration of that matter, the state
might conclude that publishers and producers should not be subjected
to censors like Mr. Justice Stewart, who rejects a "doctrinaire knee-
jerk application of the first amendment," 8 but would permit criminal
13. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
14. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964) ; Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) ; Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960); First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545
(1958); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952).
15. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952); Garner v. Board of Public
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56 (1951).
16. See Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 601 (1968); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1966) ;. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382
U.S. 87 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964); Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Teamsters' Union v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957);
Plumbers' Union v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
17. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Ginsburg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967); A Book
named "John Cleland's Memories of A Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383
U.S. 413 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966); Mishkin v. New
York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); Kingsley Inter-
national Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Smith v. California, 361 U.S.
147 (1959); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
18. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 648 (1968).
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sanctions for "hard-core pornography"-a term he cannot define-
because he knows it when he sees it.19
If so, the state might also conclude that a speaker should not be
subject to criminal sanctions whenever a jury finds that he advocated
forbidden action by means of "inciting" speech" even though what he
advocated was action in the indefinite future, "as speedily as circum-
stances would permit."21 Such a state might also wish to give more
protection against legislative and executive harrassment and blacklist-
ing on political grounds than has been found in the first amendment,22
at least until very recently. -2 3
Finally, in the area of religious liberty, a state might wish to con-
sider whether it is willing to tolerate what the Supreme Court has
held the first amendment permits by way of release time from public
schools for religious instruction 4 and Sunday closing laws.
-2 5
Other instances where a state might feel that it could improve on
federal guarantees may be found in the area of searches and seizures.
The fourth amendment was held applicable to the states in 194926 and
really made applicable in 1961 when it was decided that evidence
obtained by an illegal search was inadmissible in state trials. 7 But it
is far from apparent to me that a state should be satisfied with the
Supreme Court's rulings on what the fourth amendment permits by
19. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
20. Yates v. United States, 354 US. 298, 320 (1957); Noto v. United States, 367
U.S. 290 (1961).
21. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 512 (1951); Scales v. United States, 367
U.S. 203 (1961).
22. Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962); Communist Party v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Board, 367 US. 1 (1961); In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82
(1961); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365
U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Nelson v. County
of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959);
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959); Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399
(1958). Cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 197 (1957).
23. Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258
(1967); DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966); United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437 (1965); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963). Cf. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611
(1968).
24. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
25. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
26. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
27. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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means of electronic bugging,2" the use of informers29 and involuntary
blood tests,3" the warrantless search of automobiles,3 the extension of
the search to "mere evidence" as distinguished from contraband, fruits
of crime and weapons, 2 searches by such functionaries as building
and health inspectors,3 or the use of illegally seized evidence for im-
peachment purposes. 4
The more recent application to the states of the sixth amendment's
rights to counseP5 and to a jury trial 6 leave problems of a different
order for the states. With respect to jury trial the Court was explicit
that "the fourteenth amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all
criminal cases which-were they tried in a federal court-would come
within the sixth amendment's guarantee."3" Apparently the jury re-
quired by this guarantee is a jury of twelve, whose guilty verdict
must be unanimous. 8 Although the sixth amendment by its terms
applies in "all criminal prosecutions," neither it nor the overlapping
guaranty of jury trial "of all crimes" in article III,3" is construed to
apply to "petty offenses" as distinguished from "serious crimes." For
ordinary criminal cases, the distinction is based upon an appraisal of
the nature of the offense and the extent of the penalty authorized. The
dividing line falls somewhere between, on the one side, the offense of
selling second-hand goods without a license, punishable by ninety days
imprisonment or a $300 fine for which no jury is required,"° and, on
28. Cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (government agent wired for
sound) and Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962) with Molod v. United States, 390
U.S. 136 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967).
29. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323 (1966) (informer wired for sound); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747
(1952) (informer wired for sound).
30. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See also Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432 (1957). Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
31. Compare Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) with Harris
v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
32. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
33. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.
541 (1967). See also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
34. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
35. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
36. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
37. Id. at 149.
38. Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898). Cf. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900).
39. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
40. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
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the other side, the offenses of conspiracy to deprive persons of their
livelihood ("an offence of a grave character"), where the punishment
is only $25 or 30 days,41 and simple battery where the punishment is
two years and $300,42 for which there must be a jury. In criminal
contempt proceedings, in which the right to jury trial now also
applies,43 where no maximum penalty is usually prescribed, the test
must be based on the penalty actually imposed, and falls somewhere
between six months4 and two years.4r
The Supreme Court was not, at the time of incorporating the sixth
amendment's right to counsel into the fourteenth, explicit about the
extent of the incorporation. But we have since been told that this and
other incorporations are to be enforced against the states "according
to the same standards that protect those personal rights against
federal encroachment." 6 Arguably, therefore, the sixth amendment
right to counsel is not federally guaranteed in trials of "petty offenses."
This appears to leave open to the states the decision whether they
want to guarantee counsel or jury trials for such offenses, and whether,
if juries are provided, they are to have fewer than twelve members,
and verdicts that are less than unanimous.47
The similarly recent decision that the fourteenth amendment in-
corporates the fifth's privilege against self-incrimination, 48  again
raises for the states the question whether they should be content with
the reach of the federal guarantee or would prefer to provide a more
generous one of their own. Should the states be satisfied with a priv-
lege which protects only against compulsory "testimonal" disclosures,
and not against the use of handwriting specimens, 9 items of clothing,50
and blood tests?51 Should the states settle for privilege burdened with
41. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
42. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
43. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). But no jury trial is required for civil
contempt proceedings. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
44. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966). See also Dyke v. Taylor Implement
Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) (ten days and $50).
45. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
46. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
47. See Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. $81 (1900). Cf. WAsH. CONST., art. 1, § 21 (1889).
48. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US. 1 (1964). See also Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965).
49. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
50. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
51. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See also Breithaupt v. Abram,
352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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a doctrine of waiver which frequently leaves the witness on an un-
charted sea?52 Should they settle for a privilege which can be with-
drawn on the tender of immunity only from criminal prosecution,
state or federal, but not from the other consequences of compulsory
disclosure?53
The examples I have given are, as I have said, only illustrative.
They are not meant to be exhaustive. I hope they have not been
exhausting. They are more than sufficient, I believe, to demonstrate
that before a state constitutional convention decides to omit any guar-
antee from its Bill of Rights on the ground that federal protection is
adequate, it should at the least carefully examine the scope and
apparent durability of the federal protection. That seems to me sound
advice for each of the incorporated guarantees I have discussed and
for other incorporated guarantees which I have not taken time to
discuss-the fifth amendment's guarantee against the taking of prop-
erty without just compensation," the sixth amendment's rights to
speedy" and public50 trial, to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, 57 and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses,58
and the eighth amendment's protection against cruel and unusual
punishment.59 It seems to me equally sound for other, nonincorporative
protections found in the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment and for other federal guarantees applicable
to the states but not found in the Bill of Rights, such as the prohibi-
tions against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, impairment of the
obligation of contracts,6" and the thirteenth amendment's abolition of
52. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S.
148 (1958).
53. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
54. Chicago, B. & 0. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
55. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
56. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
57. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See also Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129
(1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415
(1965).
58. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
59. Like the incorporation of first amendment rights (see note 9, supra), incorpora-
tion of this guarantee was a two step process. First it was assumed, without deciding,
that it was incorporated in a case where its requirements were found not to be violated.
Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947). That case then became authority for the
incorporation. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
60. U.S. CoNsT., art. I, § 10, ci. 1.
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slavery and involuntary servitude, which probably does not reach all
that is forbidden by your state constitution's prohibition against im-
prisonment for debt."'
I have also suggested that, if it is desired to extend state constitu-
tional protection beyond that of the federal constitution, the objective
is not likely to be achieved merely by draftsmanship. This is not to
say that draftsmanship has no role to play. Assuming that the result is
desired, it would be possible, for instance, to redraft present provisions
of the Washington constitution to make clear that the prohibition
against state support of religion is not confined to monetary support,62
or that the guarantee of privacy extends against electronic or tele-
phonic eavesdropping and the taking of blood tests without informed
consent,63 or that the privilege against self-incrimination extends to
such involuntary "nontestimonial" disclosures as the use of hand-
writing specimens, blood tests and police lineups.6 4
But it would be futile to attempt to convert a Bill of Rights into a
detailed code which would anticipate all conceivable problems. And
probably not much can be expected from attempts to frame new
general principles to cover ground already worked. I doubt, for in-
stance, that judges will be either aided in or forced to recognition of
greater protection for individual liberties by currently fashionable
proposals to add to due process clauses requirements of "fair and just
treatment in the course of legislative and executive investigations and
hearings,"6 or to add to equal protection clauses specific prohibitions
against discrimination by the state on the basis of religion, race, color,
sex or national origin."6
61. WASH. CONST., art. 1, § 17. See Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25 (1942); Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
62. WASH. CONST., Amend. 34. See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
63. WASH. CONST., art. 1, § 7. See State v. Jennen, 58 Wn. 2d 171, 361 P.2d 739
(1961); State v. Kuljis, 70 Wn. 2d 168, 422 P.2d 480 (1967); State v. Drew, 70 Wn.
2d 193, 425 P.2d 349 (1967). See also the restrictions or prohibitions on electronic
eavesdropping in N.Y. Co~sT. art. 1, § 12; PUERTO Rico CONST., art. II, § 10 (1952);
NATIONAL MUI IPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STAT CONSTITioN, § 1.03(b) (6th ed., 1962).
64. WAsH. CoNsT., art. 1, § 9. See State v. Craig, 67 Wn. 2d 77, 406 P.2d 599
(1965); State v. Cook, 70 Wn. 2d 715, 424 P.2d 1006 (1967); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Biggers v. Tennessee,
390 U.S. 404 (1968).
65. ALASiA CONST., art. I, § 7; MIc H. CONST., art. I, § 17.
66. ALAsr-A CONST., art. I, § 3; Coin,. CONST., art. I, § 20; HAwAII CONST., art. I,
§ 4; MIcH. CoxsT., art. I, § 2; PROPOSED N.Y. CoNsT., art. I, § 3(b) (defeated at
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In the last analysis, constitutional conventions desirous of greater
protection for individual rights at the state level will probably be best
advised to do the best they can with a few formulations of general
principles which do not confine the courts, which leave room for growth
and application to new problems, and then to hope for a new era
in state constitutional interpretation.
Obviously, the new era will not arrive overnight. I have said that the
Supreme Court got into the business of developing the federal Bill of
Rights through the default of the state courts. In too many instances,
that default has continued. In 1879 the Supreme Court reversed a
state conviction and held that a state statute which limited grand and
petit jury service to white persons violated the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment." Since that time it has dealt with
numerous instances of systematic exclusion from jury service on the
basis of race which were not expressly authorized by statute. But in
1967 it reversed a state conviction in a case in which the state of
Georgia offered no explanation for the process by which it was able to
draw jurors from tax lists which contained 24% Negroes, yet ended
with a list of jurors only 5% of which were black,6" and in another
from a county in Alabama where it appeared that no Negro had ever
served on a grand jury.69
Again, the Supreme Court first invalidated under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment a state conviction based on a
coerced confession in 1936. It appeared in that case 0 that the con-
fession of one defendant was obtained after he had been twice hanged
by his neck from a tree, tied to the tree and whipped, and again
whipped a day or two later. Thereafter, the Court dealt with a great
variety of more subtle forms of coercion, but in 1967 it again reversed
a state conviction where the petitioner, lying in a field with a bullet
wound in his leg, two policemen's guns aimed at his head, and
referendum November 7, 1967); PROPOSED MD. CONST., art. I, § 1.03 (defeated at refer-
endum May 14, 1968); PUERTO Rico CONST., art. II, § 1; NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,
MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, art. I, § 1.02 (6th ed., 1962).
67. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
68. Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24 (1967). See also Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404
(1967); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
69. Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22 (1967). See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965), where it was shown that in another Alabama county no Negro had served
on a petit jury since about 1950.
70. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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threatened by one of them that he would be killed if he did not tell
the truth, confessed "immediately" after the other one "fired his rifle
next to the petitioner's ear."7'
The Court in 1942 declined to read the sixth amendment's right to
counsel into the fourteenth amendment for noncapital cases; 72 when it
overruled that determination more than twenty years later,7 nearly
one-third of the states still recognized no right to counsel in noncapital
felony cases.74
In 1949 the Court held the fourth amendment applicable to the
states, but declined to interpret that amendment to mean that the
states were barred from using illegally seized evidence at trial.7 When
it concluded, twelve years later, that the amendment should be read
to bar the use of such evidence,76 twenty four states were still using
it. 7
7
When the Court eight years ago reached the eminently sound con-
clusion that a criminal conviction based on no evidence whatsoever
could not stand under the due process clause, it acted on direct review
of a city police court judgment which was not reviewable in the state
courts .7  But in three subsequent cases in the next five years it re-
versed on the same ground convictions which state supreme courts let
stand. 9
The attitude of many state court judges, I am afraid, approaches
that of the state Chief Justices who, in 1958, with only eight dissent-
ing votes, adopted a remarkable resolution admonishing the Supreme
Court that the division of powers between state and national govern-
ments "should be tested solely by the provisions of the Constitution of
the United States" and calling upon the Court to exercise80
71. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967).
72. Betts v. Brady, 316 US. 455 (1942).
73. Gideon v. Wainright, 372 US. 335 (1963).
74. See Appendix to concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in McNeal v. Culver,
365 U.S. 109, 120-22 (1961).
75. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
76. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
77. See Appendix to opinion of the Court in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
224-25 (1960).
78. Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
79. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87 (1965); Taylor v. Louisiana, 370 U.S.
154 (1962); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
80. The Chief justices of California, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah,
Vermont, West Virginia and Hawaii dissented, and the Chief Justices of New Jersey,
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[t]he power of judicial self-restraint-by recognizing and giving
effect to the difference between that which, on the one hand, the
Constitution may prescribe or permit, and that which, on the
other, a majority of the Supreme Court, as from time to time
constituted, may deem desirable or undesirable.
The resolution did not mention the Bill of Rights.
So I do not anticipate an overnight change in the attitude of most
state judges toward constitutional guarantees. But constitutional con-
ventions must take a long view. And in that view there is cause for
hope. We may anticipate a new generation of state judges who will
place a higher value on the Bill of Rights. That generation, some of
whom are already members of the bar, will have grown up in an era
of increasing concern for individual rights under an increasingly com-
plex and bureaucratized society. They will have studied the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States and the problems with
which those decisions deal. Some of them will even have studied under
law professors sympathetic to the Court's efforts. Just as it has come
to pass that all but the most unreconstructed citizens-even the con-
servative lawyers-now accept a federally managed economy, social
welfare legislation,"' and legal equality for Negroes, so it will come to
pass that we will have state court judges predominatingly sympathetic
to a broad reading of the Bill of Rights. So I bid the state constitu-
tional conventions to be of good cheer and to draft a Bill with hope for
the future.
II. FEDERAL GUARANTEES NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
STATES
Some of the specific guarantees of the federal Bill of Rights have
not yet been held to be incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.
California, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island submitted statements in opposition to the
resolution. The Chief Justices of Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut and Indiana were not
present. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, PROCEEDINGS OF TENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES 23-34 (1958).
81. In 1955 the American Bar Association reversed a five-year stand and indorsed
coverage of self-employed lawyers under the Social Security Act, but on a voluntary
basis only. 80 A.B.A. REP. 154-55, 397 (1955). One year later it bowed to the inevitable
and indorsed compulsory coverage if voluntary coverage was not obtainable. 81 A.B.A.
REP. 403-05 (1956).
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Incorporation in the future seems more likely for some than for others.
Since all so far held to be incorporated have, save for first amendment
rights, been related to criminal proceedings, it seems appropriate to
consider omitted rights in that area first.
The right which seems most likely next in line for incorporation at
this point is the right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same
offense. Indeed, by the procedure which marked the incorporation of
first amendment rights and the eighth amendment's prohibition of
cruel and unusual punishments,82 this right is already halfway toward
incorporation. In 1947 in Francis v. Resweber,83 the Court assumed,
without deciding, that this right and the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments were incorporated, but found neither violated
by a second attempt at execution after defendant had once been
subjected to an electric chair which failed to function. Fifteen years
later the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments achieved
full incorporation., In 1966 the Court granted certiorari to determine
whether the prohibition against double jeopardy had achieved the same
status, but disnssed the writ as improvidently granted when it ap-
peared that the question was not properly presented. 5 Whatever the
ultimate decision on the federal guaranty, however, I would suppose
that, in view of the decision in the Francis case, the complexities of
the problems of reprosecution on the same charge,"0 the decisions per-
mitting the splitting of a single act or transaction into a multiplicity
of separate crimes," the decisions permitting successive prosecutions
for the same conduct by state and federal governments, 8 and the de-
cisions permitting conviction both for a substantive offense and for
conspiracy to commit it so long as the substantive offense "could be
accomplished by a single individual,"8 9 the states would want to pre-
serve their own guarantees about double jeopardy.
82. See notes 9 and 59, supra.
83. 329 US. 459 (1947).
84. Robinson v. California 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
85. Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966).
86. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); Note, Double Jeopardy: The
Reprosecution Problem, 77 HAnv. L. REv. 1273 (1964).
87. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932).
88. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 (1922).
89. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954); Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640 (1946).
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The applicability to the states of the eighth amendment's prohibi-
tions against excessive bail and excessive fines has not yet been con-
sidered by the Supreme Court. But that Court has had little to say
about excessive bail when required by the federal government 0 and
nothing about excessive fines, so for that reason alone the states should
preserve their own requirements.
Nothing has been decided, either, about the applicability to the
states of the sixth amendment's guaranty that the accused shall be in-
formed of the charges against him, but in any event it probably adds
nothing to the requirements of due process.
This leaves us with the fifth amendment's requirement of grand
jury indictment for capital or otherwise infamous crimes, held in-
applicable to the states almost eighty-five years ago.9 I would be
willing to hazard a guess that this among the federal guarantees ap-
plicable to criminal proceedings is least likely to be incorporated into
the fourteenth amendment. And since I am unpersuaded by the
theory that the grand jury stands as a bulwark "between the prosecu-
tion and the accused, . . . to determine whether the charge was
founded upon credible testimony or was dictated by malice or personal
ill will,' ' 92 I do not propose to urge that states like Washington"
which authorize prosecution by information should change their ways.
Of those unincorporated provisions of the federal Bill of Rights not
applicable to criminal proceedings, less need be said. The second
amendment's guarantee of the right of the people to keep and bear
arms was held inapplicable to the states almost a century ago,94 and
if the question is again raised I would be willing to predict that the
National Rifle Association will be less effective with the Supreme
Court than with the Congress. The similar provisions in the constitu-
tions of most states95 including Washington96 have not been construed
to prevent reasonable regulation of the possession and use of fire-
90. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
91. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). See also Gaines v. Washington, 277
U.S. 81 (1928).
92. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906).
93. WASH. CONST., art. 1, § 25.
94. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S.
252 (1886).
95. Rankin, note 8 supra, at 162.
96. WAsH. CONST., art. 1, § 24.
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arms . The third amendment's protection against the quartering of
soldiers in private homes seems to have been invoked only once-in
an unsuccessful attempt to persuade a court that a federal rent control
act "was the incubator and hatchery of swarms of bureaucrats to be
quartered as storm troopers upon the people" 0S--but it also is dupli-
cated in the constitutions of Washington 9 and most other states. 00
I was tempted to suggest that the guarantees of both the second and
third amendments were probably obsolete. But I am restrained by the
example of another who voiced the opinion, shortly before the advent
of marches on Washington and on state capitals, that the right to
petition the government for redress of grievances, while "at one time
considered fundamental," is now "viewed as a right of little im-
portance."'101
Finally, there is the seventh amendment's right to jury trial in civil
cases, also held inapplicable to the states nearly a century ago.' 2 As
the Supreme Court said in holding that a jury was required in state
criminal prosecutions, most of the debate as to the merits of the jury
system "has centered on the jury in civil cases,"'01 3 and it seems un-
likely that the guaranty of a jury in such cases will soon be imposed
upon the states. Most states, like Washington,0 " have the requirement
in some form in their own constitutions, however. 0 5 There are power-
ful arguments against the civil jury.' It also has its powerful ad-
herents, but in these days of increasingly crowded dockets1 7 I would
think that a state would want to preserve its freedom to experiment
with other devices.
97. See Pettus v. Cranor, 41 Wn. 2d 567, 250 P2d 542 (1952), cert. den. 345 U.S.
967 (1953); State v. Krantz 24 Wn. 2d 350, 164 P.2d 453 (1945); State v. Tully, 198
Wash. 605, 89 P.2d 517 (1939).
98. United States v. Valenzuela, 95 F. Supp. 363, 366 (S.D. Calif., 1951).
99. WAsH. CONST., art. 1, § 31.
100. Rankin, note 8 supra, at 162.
101. Id. at 164.
102. Edwards v. Elliott, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 532 (1874); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S.
90 (1875).
103. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
104. WA sr. CONST., art. 1, § 21.
105. COLUMBIA UvanRsrry LEoISLATwV DRAPIING RESAmCH FUND, INDEX DIGEST OF
STATE CONsTrTniONS 578 (2d ed., 1959).
106. See particularly Frank, Courts on Trial (1949).
107. See Jaas, Tm CouRTs, =an PUBLIC AND inm LAw ExPLosIoN (1965); ZFISr.,
KA vmx & BVcHEoLz, DELAY n i CouRT (1959).
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III. GUARANTEES NOT FOUND IN THE FEDERAL BILL OF
RIGHTS
The wisdom of 1789 was not the ultimate wisdom and it seems ap-
propriate to ask, almost two centuries later, whether some additions
to the federal Bill of Rights are now in order. I believe they are, in
three areas of concern-one traditional and two fairly new.
A. Democratic Theory of Government
Most state Bills of Rights contain a statement of a democratic
theory of government similar to that in the Washington constitu-
tion:10S
All political power is inherent in the people, and governments
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and
are established to protect and maintain individual rights.
It has been pointed out that such a provision is not "judicially en-
forceable,' ' 9 and that is thought to be a sufficient reason for omitting
it."' Others have offered the rather unspirited defense of such provi-
sions that, "since they do no great harm, perhaps the energy expended
in the effort to remove them might be applied to more vital mat-
ters. ' 1
1
'
I believe that a better defense can be made. Although such a pro-
vision may not of itself provide an appropriate basis for a judicial
decree, it may prove of considerable aid to the courts in construing
other constitutional provisions, such as those providing for the ini-
tiative and referendum" 2 and the guaranty of free speech." 3 Indeed,
where the processes by which the state constitution is amended and
constitutional conventions are called vest the initiative in the legisla-
108. WASH. CONST., art. 1, § 1; COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LEGISLATIVE DRAFrTDG RE-
SEARCt FuND, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 489 (2d ed., 1959).
109. See State v. Kruegel, 67 Wn. 2d 673, 409 P.2d 458 (1965); State v. Clark, 30
Wash. 439, 71 P. 20 (1902).
110. NATIONAL MuricnAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 36 (6th ed., 1962).
111. Graves, What Should Constitutions Contain? 4, quoted in Rankin, note 8,
supra, at 161.
112. See State v. Meyers, 61 Wn. 2d 772, 380 P.2d 735 (1963); Love v. King County,
181 Wash. 462, 44 P.2d 175 (1935).
113. Cf. Tacoma v. Roe, 190 Wash. 444, 68 P.2d 1028 (1937).
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ture as they do in most states, 114 and where popular initiative does
not provide an alternative as it apparently does in Washington,"'
such a provision might be invoked to empower the people to act when
the legislature fails to do so."'
In this connection it is worth noting that the constitutions of the
original states tend to be somewhat more robust than those of the
later ones. Thus, the constitution of Maryland not only asserts the
people's "inalienable right to alter, reform or abolish their form of
government in such manner as they deem expedient"" 7 but also pro-
claims that"8
[W]henever the ends of government are perverted, and public lib-
erty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are
ineffectual, the People may, and of right ought, to reform the old
or establish a new Government: the doctrine of non-resistance
against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.
A 1968 effort to reduce these provisions to a statement that, "All
political power originates in the people and all government is insti-
tuted for their liberty, security, benefit and protection"-on the
stated ground that "the right of forcible revolution as a constitutional
principle.., is inappropriate in a stable and unified United States"" 9
-fell with the rejection of the proposed new Maryland Constitution
two months ago. 20
But, while I can find virtue in provisions which enunciate a demo-
cratic theory of government, I can find none in provisions which say
nothing. In this category I would put that provision of the Washington
Bill of Rights which admonishes that, "A frequent recurrence to
fundamental principles is essential to the security of individual right
and the perpetuity of free government."' 2'
114. See Shull, Legislatures and the Process of Constitutional Amendment, 53 KY2.
LJ. 531 (1965).
115. WAsHr. CoNsT., amends. 7, 30 and 36.
116. See Heckel, The BiWl of Rights, 2 NJ. CoNsTrruTiox L CoNVENCioi or 1947
1336, 1340-1341 (1951).
117. MD. CONST., Declaration of Rights, art. 1.
118. Id., Art. 6.
119. REPORT OF THE [MAR]i CoNsn-r 'oNAL CoNvExoNi CoMnmsioN 99-100
(1967).
120. See note 66, supra.
121. WAsHr. CoNsT., art. 1, § 32.
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B. Social and Economic Rights
Some recent state constitutional provisions and some proposals take
the view that the sole purpose of a Bill of Rights is not merely to
protect individual rights against government infringement, but also to
define certain rights which the people can expect from government. 22
Among these are the right of labor to organize and bargain collec-
tively,1 21 the right of the needy to public assistance, 2 4 the right of
employees to a reasonable minimum salary,12 5 and the right of all to
full educational opportunity. 28
These provisions have also been criticized as not enforceable, 27 and
insofar as they require the use of public funds it is doubtless true that
neither constitutional conventions nor courts are equipped to make
appropriations. 2 But this is simply to say that these nontraditional
rights should not be recognized because they cannot be enforced in
the traditional way. It is nonetheless true that, if the promotion of
such rights is viewed as proper, their inclusion in a Bill of Rights
could serve some useful purposes. The very fact of their adoption
should be viewed as a mandate to the legislature to act to implement
them. Particularly if they included their own "necessary and proper
clauses," they would make clear the authority of the legislature to
act, just as the grants of power to Congress to implement the thir-
teenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments are construed to give it
independent authority to legislate.'29 And in a state like Washington
which reserves to the people the right of initiative"8 such provisions
could serve the same authorizing function for the voters.
122. See Graves, A New Bill of Rights? 46 NAT. MuN. REV. 238 (1957).
123. MO. CONST., art. 1, §29; N.J. CONST., art. 1, § 19; N.Y. CONST., art. 1, § 17;
PUERTO RICO CONST. art. II, § 18. Such a provision was also included in the NATIONAL
MUNICIPAL LEAGUE'S MODEL STATE CONSTTUTION, art. I, § 103 (5th ed. 1948). It was
dropped from a later edition with the explanation that "under present conditions" these
rights "appear to need no separate constitutional reflection," although it was recognized
that "in some jurisdictions there may be need for the inclusion of such provisions." Id.,
37 (6th ed., 1962). The proposed New York constitution, rejected in 1967 (note 66,
supra), would have perpetuated such a provision as Art. 1, § 10.
124. N.Y. CONST., art. 17, § 1 (1938).
125. PUERTO Rico CONST., art. II, § 16.
126. Id., art. II, § 5.
127. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 37 (6th Ed., 1962).
128. Insofar as such provisions would regulate private conduct, they are governed
by what is said about that subject below.
129. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); United States v. Guest, 387
U.S. 745 (1966); Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905).
130. WASH. CONST., amends. 7, 26, 30, and 36.
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Hence, I would suggest that a constitutional convention should con-
sider the wisdom of incorporating some declarations of social and
economic rights-cast, perhaps, in a larger focus than some of those
I have previously cited, such as a right to an adequate standard of
living, a right to full educational opportunity, and a right to a decent
measure of leisure.1 3'
C. Regulation of Private Conduct
All provisions of a Bill of Rights need not be directed to or against
government. Some may also regulate private conduct, as does the thir-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
As Walter Gellhorn and Alexander Pekelis have pointed out, 32 the
growing concentration of economic power in our society means, among
other things, that more and more of our lives are subject to the control
of "private governments" against whose excesses we are also in need
of a Bill of Rights. The proposed New York state constitution re-
jected last year took a modest step in this direction by providing
that"'
No person shall, because of race, color, creed, religion, national
origin, age, sex or physical or mental handicap be subjected to
any discrimination in his civil rights by the state or any subdivi-
sion, agency or instrumentality thereof or by any person, corpo-
ration or unincorporated association, public or private (emphasis
added).
The sanction behind this provision was limited: "The legislature
shall provide that no public money shall be given or loaned to or in-
vested with any person or entity, public or private, violating this pro-
vision." But there is no apparent reason why the provision could not
131. The declaration of personal rights prepared for Presidefit Franklin D. Roose-
velt is suggestive. NATiONAL REsouRcEs PLAN~no BOARD, NATIONAL REsou-Rcs DEvEL-
oPriNT REPoRT 3 (1942). So is the United Nation's Declaration of Human Rights. So
are the provisions of the French and Japanese constitutions cited in Dionisapoulos,
Indiana, 1851, Alaska 1956: A Century of Difference in State Constitutions, 34 IND. L.J.
34, 35 (1958).
132. W. GELLHoRN, Ammuxc RiGnTs, Ch. 9 (1960); A. PExxrIs, LAw ANm SocIAL
AcrioN, 91-127 (1950).
133. Art. I, § 3b. I have previously indicated that, insofar as this provision applies
to the state, it probably adds nothing to a state equal protection clause. But I would
concede that, as a rule for private conduct, it should be more narrowly drawn than an
equal protection clause.
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be made "judicially enforceable" by express authorization of enforce-
ment by public or private action.
Nor is there any apparent reason why the constitutional proscrip-
tion should be confined to private discrimination. Other rights which
all constitutions guarantee against the state-and particularly rights
of belief, speech and association-are as vulnerable to infringement
by "private governments" and as deserving of protection from such
infringement.
So I commend also to state constitutional conventions the task of
attempting to preserve our individual freedoms not merely against
those governments we elect but also against those governments we do
not elect.
II. NEW HORIZONS FOR A STATE BILL
OF RIGHTS*
Arval A. Morris**
A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to
the security of individual right and the perpetuity of free gov-
ernment.
-WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32.
A Bill of Rights is a basic part of each American constitution, in
part summarizing the past experiences of a people and serving as a
continuous reminder to their government of the rights which the people
deem fundamental to their liberty and welfare. Currently there are
additional reasons for incorporating a Bill of Rights into a state con-
stitution. Some people' want a state Bill of Rights in order to slow
* This article was presented at the State Constitutional Revision Conference,
sponsored by the University of Washington School of Law, Seattle, Washington (June
13-14, 1968).
** Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., Colorado College, 1951; MA.,
1952, J.D., 1955, University of Colorado; LL.M., Yale, 1958.
1. Countryman, Why a State Bill oj Rights?, 45 WAsE. L. REv. 454, 455 (1970)
(hereinafter cited as Countryman], quoting Hart, The Bill of Rights: Safeguard of
Individual Liberty, 35 TExAs L. REv. 919, 924 (1957).
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